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30 Nov. 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Guidance for Planning  
Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba

## NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

### 1. The Executive Committee of the National Security

Council has established the following objectives for overflight of Cuba.

#### a. Determination of the status of

offensive weapons systems in Cuba.

#### b. Determination of military deployment

which would threaten Guantanamo.

#### c. Surveillance of military and unidentified

establishments to note changes of pertinence to a and

#### b. (Such surveillance would include the outward

movement of IL-28s although precise information on

the loading of IL-28 crates on outgoing ships would

require more frequent high altitude coverage than we

consider necessary at this time and more low level

missions than we feel the importance of verification

warrants.)

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d. The acquisition of technical intelligence on significant Soviet weapons systems now in Cuba to determine critical characteristics which would effect our military posture vis-a-vis the USSR apart from Cuba.

In meeting these requirements, it should be understood that the objective is to have timely warning of any substantial change in the situation. It is not essential that every cargo be examined and every rumor traced by low-level photography. What the Government needs is information which will protect it in good time against any new threat of offensive weapons in militarily significant numbers.

2. The United States has a priority need for continuing and reliable information with respect to the general order of magnitude and deployment of Soviet military units and installations in Cuba, although there is not at present a requirement for immediate tactical information. Our object is primarily to have adequate continuing information on the Soviet military presence in Cuba as a major element in the political situation in the Caribbean. Procurement of intelligence on Soviet weapons systems is important but secondary.

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3. The United States Government is prepared to use both low-level and high-level reconnaissance, but it is desired that where practicable necessary intelligence be obtained by a regular schedule of high-level flights, with low-level missions called for on the basis of specific indications of a target of special interest.

4. The Executive Committee expects the United States Intelligence Board to supply current target lists and a statement of the frequency of coverage and the resolution and scale of photography required to permit operational planning of both high and low level missions.

McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs